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ABSTRACT 
Since the 9/11 attacks, the possibility of another attack on America using 
radiological weapons has been a subject of much discussion both in the press, in national 
security and homeland security circles and in the academic literature.  While much of the 
federal government’s focus has been on preventing radiological material from being 
smuggled into the United States, this thesis examines the possibility of terrorists using 
materials that are readily available in medical, research and industrial locations.  A dirty 
bomb or radiological dispersal device could have a devastating impact on the economy 
and greatly raise public fears. 
Local police agencies have previously not had a formal role in radiological 
security.  This thesis explores policy initiatives, based on community policing principles 
conducted at the local police level, which will enhance security at locations where 
radiological materials are kept.  
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Many dangerous radiological sources are kept in hospitals, research facilities and 
industrial settings with relatively light security.  Security in these facilities has typically 
focused on the danger of exposure to and safe handling of radioactive materials and not 
on these substances falling into the wrong hands.  Conventional explosives combined 
with powerful (and available) radioactive elements such as cobalt 60, cesium 137, or 
iridium can create a “dirty bomb” or radiological dispersal device (RDD) capable of 
rendering an area uninhabitable for decades.  Poorly protected radiological sources are 
tempting targets for theft by terrorists.  Adding a radioactive component to a conventional 
bomb can magnify the fear, psychological trauma, panic, and financial disruption 
generated by an act of terrorism. Every year, approximately 250 radiological devices are 
reported lost or missing in America.1  These radiological sources are much more readily 
available than most people realize.   
A recent survey of homeland security experts identified a radiological dispersal 
device, or dirty bomb, as the most likely unconventional weapon to be used against the 
United States.2  In 2005, Senator Richard Lugar, chairman of the United States Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, commissioned a survey of eighty-five arms control and 
national security experts to assess the possibility of a chemical, biological, radiological, 
or nuclear attack on a western nation.  These respondents also identified a “dirty bomb” 
as the most likely occurrence, estimating the risk at forty percent over the next decade.3 
Local police agencies have not typically been involved in the protection of 
radiological materials; private security is directly responsible for securing these materials.  
                                                 
1 United States Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Security: Federal and State Action 
Needed to Improve Security of Sealed Radioactive Sources, GAO-03-804, August 2003, 4. 
2 Center for American Progress and Foreign Policy Magazine Terrorism Survey, Foreign Policy, June 
2006, www.ForeignPolicy.org, [Accessed March 13, 2006]. 
3 Michael Richardson, “Weapons of Mass Disruption Await,” New Zealand Herald, October 6, 2005. 
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Federal and State regulators are charged with overseeing radiological security for certain 
licensees but significant gaps in security remain unfilled.4  
A key element lacking in current radiological security is any partnership or 
collaboration with local law enforcement.  This lack of collaboration results in a lack of 
coordination and information or intelligence sharing.  Without a system or network of 
collaboration between law enforcement and private radiological security, there can be no 
uniform purpose or mission. 
Law enforcement, traditionally, only becomes involved after materials have been 
stolen.  Most first responders have no idea of the location of radioactive sources and 
materials in their jurisdictions.  Since 9/11, police agencies have been asked to take on 
numerous new homeland security roles without corresponding increases in budgets.  The 
police have been asked to take on these duties at a time of decreased staffing and 
increased crime.5 This thesis addresses the challenges facing local police agencies in 
trying to prevent acts of radiological terrorism.  This question is of importance not only to 
local law enforcement but also to radiological security professionals, the intelligence 
community, and homeland security planners and researchers. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis examines the issue of what role local police agencies should play in 
radiological security and poses these two research questions: 
1) How can local police intelligence centers be part of a police radiation 
security program?   
2) How can local law enforcement agencies deal with increasing crime and 
reduced staffing levels and play a role in securing their jurisdictions from 
radiological attack? 
                                                 
4 Charles D. Ferguson and Joel O. Lubenau, “Securing U.S. Radioactive Sources,” Issues in Science 
and Technology 20, no. 1 (Fall 2003): 67. 
5 James Alan Fox, “Wall Needed Between Politics and Policing:  President’s Commitment to 
Constabulary is Cop Out,” Boston Herald, July 17, 2006, 23. 
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Local police departments have not previously had a formal role in protecting 
radiological materials.  The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued 
new guidelines for securing radioactive materials of certain quantities.6  These guidelines 
require licensees to collaborate with local law enforcement on security for radioactive 
materials and give local law enforcement a new formal role in radiological security.  A 
review of recent scholarly journals and research databases found no relevant studies on 
the topic.  While there is no research published yet on this area, there is extensive 
literature on “dirty bombs” and the threat of terrorists using radiological dispersal 
devices; this thesis makes use of that material.  
There is disagreement among experts about the threat from a dirty bomb.  Stephen 
Pincock, who writes for The Scientist, argues that the fear of dirty bombs is overblown, as 
no one knows what would happen, because no one apparently has ever set one off.7 Other 
experts have alleged that the former government of Iraq, and also al Qaeda, have both 
experimented and attempted to detonate dirty bombs.8  Charles Ferguson, a noted author 
on the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism, calls dirty bombs “weapons of mass 
disruption,” as opposed to weapons of mass destruction.9  Ferguson finds the devices are 
primarily a means to spread panic and fear rather than death and destruction.  Other 
researchers do label dirty bombs as weapons of mass destruction because the long term 
environmental clean-up results in an effective loss of the impacted area for possibly 
                                                 
6 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “In the Matter of all Licensees Authorized to Possess Radioactive 
Material Quantities of Concern, Order Imposing Increased Controls,” Notices, Attachment A, Federal 
Register 71, no. 98 (May 22, 2006).  Author’s note:  Attachment A contains sensitive information and will 
not be released to the public. 
7 Stephen Pincock, “Terrorists Using ‘Dirty Bombs’ to Spread Radiation are a Chilling Prospect.  But 
is the Fear Justified by the Actual Danger They Pose?”  Financial Times, September 10, 2004, 13. 
8 Michael P. Donohue, “Understanding the Dirty Bomb and Its Policy Implications,” Homeland 
Security Law and Policy, William C. Nicholson ed.  (Springfield, Il:  Charles C. Thomas, 2005), 278. 
9 Karen Eschbacher, “Experts Say Dirty Bombs are more Disruptive than Destructive,” Patriot Ledger, 
January 20, 2005.  
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decades, while increased cancer rates, resulting in casualties years after the event has 
taken place, could lead to enormous financial costs.10   
Andy Oppenheimer is a specialist in nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.  
In a special report in Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor, which is a highly regarded 
open source intelligence channel, Oppenheimer challenges the view of Ferguson and 
other experts that an RDD is not a weapon of mass destruction.  He revaluates the threat 
based on expert intelligence opinion and in marked contrast to previous assessments 
predicts that terrorists could kill hundreds with an RDD and sicken thousands using 
radioactive materials that are readily available in commercial and medical use.11 
Several terms are used interchangeably in the literature on radiological weapons, 
which creates some confusion. Andrew Grotto, in “Defusing the Threat of Radiological 
Weapons:  Integrating the Prevention with Detection and Response,” clarifies the 
distinctions between radiological terrorism and nuclear terrorism.  Further distinctions are 
noted in Andrew Karan’s research between radiological weapons, radiological dispersal 
devices, and radiological poisoning, all separate tactics of radiological terrorism.12 
Nuclear terrorism is a separate threat and concerns either the development or 
acquisition, by terrorists, of a nuclear weapon that is capable of exploding from a chain 
reaction created by fissionable material.  A comprehensively researched RAND case 
study on nuclear terrorism, by Sara Daly, John Parachini and William Rosenau, argues 
that developing or purchasing black market nuclear weapons is much more difficult than 
generally believed. Many nations have struggled for decades to develop nuclear weapons.  




                                                 
10 Anonymous, “Dirty Bomb Seen Creating Mass Havoc, According to Year Long Pentagon Study,” 
Law Enforcement News 30, no. 616 (Spring 2004), 6. 
11 A.  Oppenheimer, “The Radiological Threat Widens,” Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor, 
Special Report (September 1, 2004). 
12 P. Andrew Karan, “Radiological Terrorism,” Human and Ecological Risk Assessment, 11 (2005): 
503. 
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material are difficult to obtain; even the best-financed terrorist groups such as al Qaeda 
and Aum Shinrikyo have been unable to build or buy a nuclear device on the black 
market.13 
Finally, there are numerous technical difficulties in constructing a nuclear 
weapon.14  The literature describes the daunting task a terrorist group faces in 
constructing a nuclear device.  A dirty bomb, or radiological dispersal device, on the 
other hand, is relatively easy to construct and offers the fear and propaganda value of a 
nuclear weapon, if not the destructive power.  Operationally, for a terrorist, a dirty bomb 
is a realistic weapon; instructions are openly available over the internet.  The Islamic 
militant online forum Alghorabaa.net, a website that has been used by Al Qaeda and Iraqi 
insurgents, recently posted instructions in Arabic on how to make a dirty bomb.15 
Some authors, such as Brian Jenkins, have questioned terrorist predilections 
toward weapons of mass destruction or the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear 
weapons.  Bruce Hoffman, a renowned expert on terrorism, argues persuasively that 
religiously motivated terrorists are more likely to use these types of weapons than secular 
or ethnic terrorists.16   
The literature on the role of local police in fighting terrorism has grown 
considerably since 9/11.  Police agencies have been assigned new anti-terrorism roles 
such as protecting critical infrastructures and key resources.  Unfortunately, numerous 
studies identify insufficient resources and falling manpower levels as impediments to 
carrying out these new roles.  Los Angeles Police Chief William Bratton has warned that 
police agencies are abandoning successful community policing programs as they focus 
                                                 
13 Sara Daly, John Parachini, and William Rosenau, “Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda and the Kinshasa 
Reactor, Implications of Three Case Studies for Combating Nuclear Terrorism,” Project Air Force 
Research Brief (Santa Monica, CA:  RAND Corporation, 2004), viii.  www.rand.org,  [Accessed May 6, 
2007]. 
14Ibid. 
15Staff, “Al Qaeda Publishes Online Dirty Bomb, How to Guide,” U.S. Fed News, September 1, 2006, 
Newswire Service. 
16 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Revised and Expanded Edition (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2006), 269. 
 6
heavily on preventing terrorism.17  At the same time, local police agencies face a rising 
crime rate.  The FBI Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program reports that violent crime 
is rising in the United States after having fallen for the past ten years.18  The Police 
Executive Research Forum has published a study indicating that the redirection of federal 
resources to homeland security has left cities more vulnerable to violent crime, and that 
police efforts need to be directed at reducing both street violence and terrorism.19 
Much of the current scholarly research on the police role in preventing terrorism 
examines the role of local police intelligence.  An excellent study by the RAND 
Corporation, State and Local Intelligence in the War on Terrorism, examines state and 
local law enforcement’s counter-terrorism intelligence activities, and finds that activities 
are tied to perceived risk.20  The study also finds that fusion centers are being developed 
at the state level, along with regional intelligence centers in major urban areas.  Local 
agencies such as the Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEW) and the Boston 
Regional Intelligence Center (BRIC) are being recognized nationally for breaking new 
ground in the prevention of terrorism.21   
Private security efforts and effectiveness have been challenged by researchers.  
The United States Government Accountability Office has been critical of the security of 
sealed radiological sources, which are often kept in medical, research, and industrial 
settings.22  The Congressional Research Service has questioned the capabilities, training, 
                                                 
17 Gregory Smith, “Community Policing Guru Issues Warning,” Providence Journal, March 2, 2006.  
18 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States 2005 (Washington, DC: United Stares 
Department of Justice, September 2006), 3. 
19 Chuck Wexler, A Gathering Storm:  Violent Crime in America (Washington, DC: Police Executive 
Research Forum, 2006), 2. 
20 K. Jack Riley, Gregory F. Treverton, Jeremy M. Wilson, and Lois M. Davis, State and Local 
Intelligence in the War on Terrorism (Santa Monica CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), 3. 
21 John P. Sullivan, “Terrorism Early Warning and Co-Production of Counterterrorism Intelligence,” 
Research Paper presented at the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies International 
Conference on October 21, 2005 in Montreal, Canada, 1. 
22 United States Government Accountability Office, “Nuclear Security:  Federal and State Action 
Needed to Improve Security of Sealed Radioactive Sources,” GAO-03-804 (August 2003), 2. 
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qualifications, and background checks of private security personnel charged with 
guarding critical infrastructure and key industries.23   
In “Parallels Between Community Oriented Policing and the War on Terrorism:  
Lessons Learned,” William V. Pelfrey Jr. identifies the Community Oriented Policing 
theory as a basis for creating a local policing counter-terrorism strategy.  Newspaper 
articles from police chiefs around the United States have also identified community 
policing as a foundation for homeland security.  Articles such as “Community Policing 
Has Security Benefits,”24  which appeared in the Ventura County Star, and “Better 
Community Policing Would Improve Security,”25 by Australian Attorney General Phillip 
Ruddock in the Financial Times, have championed the concept of community policing as 
an anti-terrorism strategy.  Noted criminologist George Kelling and Los Angeles Police 
Chief William Bratton have co-authored an article, “Policing Terrorism,” for the 
Manhattan Research Institute, recommending that successful community policing 
techniques be adapted for the war on terror.26  Could these be a model for local police 
efforts in radiological security? 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
President Bush, in his message to Congress on the need to create a new Cabinet 
Department of Homeland Security, stressed the need for cooperation among all levels of 
government – particularly local government and public safety agencies – to protect the 
nation against the “most deadly weapons known to mankind:” chemical, biological,  
 
                                                 
23 Paul W. Parfomak, “Guarding America:  Security Guards and U.S. Critical Infrastructure 
Protection,” Congressional Research Service, RL 32670, November 12, 2004  2. 
24 Chief Patrick Miller, “Community Policing Has Security Benefits,” Ventura County Star, February 
12, 2005. 
25 Philip Ruddock, “Better Community Policing Would Improve Security,” Financial Times, 
Australian Associated Press Newsfeed, July 31, 2005. 
26 George L. Kelling and William J. Bratton, “Policing Terrorism,” Civic Bulletin No.43, September 
2006, 2. 
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radiological and nuclear threats.27   The research presented in this thesis identifies a new 
policy model for local police agencies to aid in the prevention of radiological attacks by 
working in partnership with private security. 
This thesis will be of interest to local law enforcement agencies, state radiation 
control programs, and federal regulatory commissions.  Additional research on measuring 
the effectiveness of the recommended policy options is recommended.  The partnership 
approach versus the increased compliance by stricter regulatory controls can be examined 
as states enact different schemes to enhance security.  This thesis may also benefit 
scholars researching comparative anti-terrorism strategies and future applications of 
community policing and intelligence-led policing. 
E. METHOD   
The policy options analysis method is utilized to analyze different implementation 
alternatives for a local police radiological security role.  The applicability, feasibility, and 
sustainability of each option is evaluated and a cost benefit analysis conducted.  A 
qualitative assessment matrix is constructed; possible negative consequences and 
potential degrees of effectiveness are measured. 
The problem of radiological materials being poorly secured is identified through 
the review of government reports.  The concept of using the community policing 
philosophy as a basis for a local police strategy for radiological security is proposed as a 
solution.  A model policy for local police agencies to follow is presented along with 
policy implementation recommendations. 
                                                 
27 George W. Bush, “Message to the Congress of the United States on Proposed Legislation to Create 
a New Cabinet Department of Homeland Security,” June 18, 2002, www.whitehouse.gov, [Accessed 
March 15, 2007]. 
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II.  RADIOLOGICAL TERRORISM 
We must face the brutal reality that no technical remedies can provide 
complete confidence that we are safe from radiological attacks  
Dr. Henry Kelly28 
On June 10, 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft stunned the country with this 
statement: “I am pleased to announce today a significant step forward in the war on 
terrorism.  We have captured a known terrorist who was exploring a plan to build and 
explode a radiological device, or ‘dirty bomb’ in the United States and is being held as an 
enemy combatant.”29  The term “dirty bomb” quickly became part of the nation’s lexicon 
with the arrest of José Padilla, a former Chicago gang member who became an al Qaeda 
associate.  While many civil libertarians have questioned the subsequent continued 
detention and extraordinary legal treatment of an American citizen as enemy combatant, 
his arrest dramatized a new threat for the American homeland: radiological terrorism.  
How much of a threat a radiological device poses for American security has been 
questioned.  The media broadcast images of a mushroom cloud in conjunction with the 
story but the reality is that a “dirty bomb” is not a nuclear weapon.  The threat has raised 
the public’s fear of a radiological attack.  In order to fully examine the threat, it is helpful 
to first briefly review the characteristics and capabilities of radiation. 
A. RADIATION  
Radiation is poorly understood by the public and by many public safety 
personnel.  Radiation is a form of energy.  We are surrounded by radiation from many 
sources.  The sun’s rays warming the earth are a form of radiation.  Background radiation 
occurs naturally in the environment and is always present at some level.   
                                                 
28 Dr. Henry Kelly, President of the American Federation of Scientists, Testimony before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee March 6, 2002, www.fas.org/maincontent, [Accessed March 27, 2007]. 
29 Tony Kahron, “Person of the Week:  Jose Padilla,” Time, June 14, 2002. 
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Atoms are the basic building blocks of matter.  Most atoms are stable.  A few are 
unstable or radioactive.  The type of radiation we need to be concerned about comes from 
radioactive atoms.  A radioactive atom emits radioactivity because the nucleus has too 
many particles, too much energy, or too much mass to be stable.30  The nucleus 
disintegrates in an attempt to reach a non-radioactive (stable) state.  As the nucleus 
disintegrates, energy is released in the form of radiation.  The decaying of the nuclei 
causes three types of radiation: alpha, beta, and gamma.  Alpha radiation loses energy 
rapidly and is less likely to penetrate the skin and cause damage.  Beta radiation travels 
faster and is capable of penetrating the skin and causing damage.  Gamma radiation 
travels at the speed of light, is extremely penetrating, and causes serious radiation 
damage to internal organs.31   
Most of the radiation training currently conducted centers on protection from 
radiation penetration.  A sheet of paper can stop alpha radiation.  Several layers of 
clothing will protect against beta radiation.  However, several feet of solid material is 
needed to protect against gamma radiation.    Besides shielding from a radioactive source, 
two other variables are important when dealing with radiation: time and distance.  
Radiation exposure guidelines have been developed primarily from what was learned 
from the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  Time and distance are critical factors for 
first responders to understand in dealing with radiation exposure.  The closer a first 
responder is to a high radiation area the less time should be spent in the area.    
First responders should also understand that radiation exposure is different from 
radiation contamination.  A person who is exposed to radiation is not necessarily 
contaminated by radiation.  A person who has received an x-ray has been exposed to 
radiation but is not contaminated by radiation.32  A contaminated person has radioactive 
materials on or inside his or her body.  This could be from breathing in radioactive 
                                                 
30 Eric J. Hall, “Radiation and Life,” www.uic.com.au/ral.htm, [Accessed February 11, 2007]. 
31 Conference of Radiation Control Directors, First Responders Guide, Radiological Dispersal Device, 
CRCPD Publication #06-RDD-c, www.crcpd.org, [Accessed February 11, 2007]. 
32 Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Department of Health and Human Services, Emergency 
Preparedness and Response, “Radioactive Contamination and Radiation Exposure.”  
www.bt.cdc.gov/radiation/contamination.asp, [Accessed February 20, 2007]. 
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material in the air or swallowing material.  A person could be externally contaminated 
when the material is on a person’s clothing or skin.   A person who is contaminated by 
radiation could expose others to radiation. 
B. THE RADIOLOGICAL TERRORIST THREAT 
What is the threat from radiological weapons?  Media speculation and indeed 
much of homeland security training has focused on response to an attack by a weapon of 
mass destruction.  Is this a real threat?  The effectiveness of radiological dispersal 
weapons has been controversial.  The most common incident has been the “dirty bomb 
scenario.”  Indeed, the Boston UASI region just conducted a major exercise, “Operation 
Poseidon,” on June 20, 2006, that focused on the regional response to a dirty bomb 
incident at a large shopping mall.  One criticism of current homeland security 
preparedness has been a focus on worst-case scenarios as opposed to realistic ones.  Is 
radiological terrorism a legitimate threat?  
C. HISTORY 
It is important to remember that there has never been a terrorist explosion of a 
“dirty bomb.”  Also, the concept of creating a radiological bomb or using radioactivity as 
a weapon is not new.  General Douglas MacArthur proposed the idea of using radioactive 
material along the Chinese-Korean border to prevent further crossings of Chinese troops 
into Korea.33  In 1941, the National Academy of Sciences first explored the idea of using 
conventional bombs to distribute radioactive material in enemy territory.34 It has also 
been alleged that Sadam Hussein experimented with military uses of “dirty bombs” in the 
1980s.  
 D. RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSAL WEAPONS (RDW’S)   
First, a distinction should be made between radiological terrorism and nuclear 
terrorism.  The terms are often used indiscriminately by the press and even by some 
                                                 
33 Karan, 501. 
34 Karan, 503. 
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homeland security professionals, but these are distinct terms.  Radiological terrorism 
involves contamination by radioactive materials.  Terrorists have explored or threatened 
to use several different tactics for dispersing or emitting these materials.  A radiological 
dispersal device, (RDD) consists of conventional explosives surrounded by radioactive 
material.  The explosion of the device spreads radioactive material throughout the blast 
field sickening or killing those exposed if sufficiently powerful radioactive material is 
used.   
A radiological emitting device (RED) is a hidden source of radioactive material 
that can be used to sicken or kill people who pass close by it. Radiological poisoning 
entails placing radioactive material in food or water.35  When radioactive material is used 
to contaminate livestock, fish, food crops, or water supplies it is referred to as a 
radiological dispersal weapon (RDW) and there can be a wide variety of means by which 
the agent is delivered – a direct attack on a nuclear facility, material spread by human 
agents, delivered by aerosol containers, or dropped from a crop duster airplane – any 
number of methods could be deployed.  The U.S. Military does not provide official 
casualty predictions for radiological dispersal weapons due to the nature of the weapon 
and the many differences in time, proximity to source, method of exposure (whether 
inhalation or ingestion), and other variables which determine the effectiveness of the 
weapon.  The Department of Defense does note that radiological weapons have enormous 
potential for intimidation.36   
Nuclear terrorism is a separate threat and concerns either the development or 
acquisition of a nuclear weapon, by terrorists, capable of exploding from a chain reaction 
created by fissionable material.  Many nations have struggled for decades to develop 
nuclear weapons.  Despite all of the media hype about “suitcase nukes,” these weapons 
and fissionable material have been difficult to obtain.  There are numerous technical 
difficulties in constructing a nuclear weapon.  Even the best-financed terrorist groups 
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such as al Qaeda and Aum Shinrikyo were unable to build or buy a nuclear device on the 
black market.37  The case studies suggest that developing or purchasing black market 
nuclear weapons is much more difficult than generally believed.38 
E. RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSAL DEVICE 
As noted earlier, a dirty bomb, or radiological dispersal device, on the other hand 
is relatively easy to construct and generates the fear and propaganda value of a nuclear 
weapon if not the destructive power.  In contrast to a nuclear device, the technical and 
operational capacity for construction and detonation of a dirty bomb are realistically 
obtainable by a terrorist group.  Instructions are openly available over the internet.  
Conventional explosives can be combined with readily available radioactive elements 
that are common in industry and medicine.  Cobalt 60, cesium 137 or iridium are 
powerful radioactive elements that are much more commonly available than most people 
believe.  Various factors influence how effectively a radiological dispersal device will 
function such as, geographic area, wind and the strength of the radioactive material used 
in the weapon.  A weapon of sufficient strength could render an area uninhabitable for 
decades.  The overall social, political and economic ramifications of a successful 
radiological terrorist attack would be enormous regardless of the number of people killed 
in the initial explosion.39  
The real benefit to a terrorist is the enormous fear, psychological trauma, panic, 
and financial disruption that such an attack would generate.  Terrorist attacks result in 
more severe psychological consequences than other types of traumatic events due to the 
perceived lack of control by the public.40  Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 
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terrorism are believed to be particularly likely to cause psychological problems in a major 
portion of the population. These weapons are unfamiliar, the symptoms are usually 
undetectable (at least initially), and the public perceives this means of attack as being 
particularly reprehensible.41  The media coverage would be international and 
undoubtedly sensational in its reporting.  An RDD would be a formidable economic and 
psychological weapon in the hands of a terrorist. 
Bernard Anet of the Spiez Laboratories in Switzerland conducted what is widely 
accepted as one of the definitive assessments of the qualitative risk of nuclear terrorism.  
Anet compared the technical feasibility, probability, and effects and damage of the 
various nuclear threats, and found that radiological terrorism had the highest risk factor.42  
The long-term psychological effects of radiological terrorism on the affected general 
public would be strongest as well.  Anet found that radiological terrorism is the dominant 
threat in the context of nuclear terrorism.43 
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Table 1.   Qualitative Assessment of the Risk of Radiological Terrorism [From Anet]44 
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F. “SMOKY BOMB” 
A new category of radiological dispersal device, termed a smoky bomb, has been 
recently proposed by Dr. Peter D. Zimmerman, a London nuclear physicist.45  Such a 
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device would be constructed in the form of an improvised incendiary device (IID) as 
opposed to an improvised explosive device (IED).  One perceived drawback to a terrorist 
use of dirty bombs in the past was that they would not result in mass casualties – only in 
mass panic.  Zimmerman conceives a device that would disperse radioactive material 
through smoke that would be inhaled into victims’ lungs.  This smoke could produce 
acute radiation poisoning in lethal doses if deployed in an enclosed area such as a subway 
car.  Even small doses of some radioisotopes would lead to cancer and other long term 
health problems for victims and first responders.  A smoky bomb could spread 
radioactive particles farther than a dirty bomb and result in even greater panic and 
disruption.46  
The use of an alpha emitter isotope such as Polonium 210, the material that was 
used to kill former KGB officer Alexander Litvinenko, has been proposed by Zimmeran 
as a material that could be used with deadly effects in such a weapon.  Other isotopes 
such as Americium-241, are more commonly available in the United States and are used 
in a number of industrial and medical devices.  Alpha radiation sources are not as tightly 
controlled as gamma radiation sources.  A danger for first responders is that many 
standard radiation detectors are designed to detect only gamma radiation meaning the 
initial radiation hazard may not be recognized.  The model for a smoky bomb would be 
the Chernobyl reactor fire in 1986.  A large amount of radioactive material was released 
and carried across large parts of Europe.  There were only thirty-two initial deaths from 
radiation exposure but many thousands more have reportedly died from the long-term 
effects of the exposure.  The area around Chernobyl has still not been resettled due to 
high radioactive levels. 
G. EXPERT PREDICTIONS 
A review of the various terrorist incident databases, such as the National 
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of 
Terrorism (MIPT), reveal very few instances of radiological terrorism or other CBNRE 
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terrorism.47  However, despite the threat being comparatively small, it is real.  A recent 
survey of over 100 terrorism and national security experts, conducted by Foreign Policy 
magazine, asked them to rate the top threat to American national security.48  The experts 
rated nuclear weapons as the top threat followed closely by weapons of mass destruction 
and then terrorism.  As to what type of terrorist attack was most likely to occur next in 
America, 67% indicated a suicide bomber followed by 20% who believed a radiological 
weapon would be the most likely.   Experts also identified a radiological dispersal device 
or dirty bomb as the most likely unconventional weapon to be used against the United 
States. 
Besides the technical difficulties and government controls of radioactive 
materials, there are political, moral, and psychological factors that have prevented 
terrorist groups from using these weapons in the past.  Ethno-national groups, such as the 
IRA, certainly have the operational know-how and ability to carry out a radiological 
attack.  However, ethno-national groups are extremely unlikely to use these weapons in 
their own areas for fear of contamination of the land that they are trying to gain control of 
and because of the indiscriminate nature of these weapons.  They are just as likely to 
harm or kill their own population.  The effects on the group would be reduced popular 
support and, likely, reduced financial support.  State-sanctioned terrorists may also be 
reluctant to use these weapons because sponsor states fear retaliation.  An unconventional 
radiological attack may harm their cause politically more than help it. 
The conventional academic view of terrorists’ use of CBRNE weapons was 
probably best espoused by Brian Jenkins: “Terrorists want a lot of people watching and a 
lot of people listening, not a lot of people dead.”49  This view has certainly changed since 
9/11.  Terrorists do seek mass casualties.  In light of the 9/11 attacks, the continuing 
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situation in Iraq, and the hotel bombings in Amman, mass casualties inflicted in a 
spectacular fashion is certainly an objective of some terrorist groups.   
H. RELIGIOUSLY MOTIVATED TERRORISTS 
Secular terrorists may still refrain from the use of these weapons but the mindsets 
of religiously motivated terrorists, as Hoffman points out, makes them more likely to use 
these weapons.50  The psychological process of the group’s demonizing and 
dehumanizing of their targets and the belief that they are carrying out “god’s will” all 
contribute to the group’s potential use of mass-casualty weapons.  Moral and religious 
constraints on killing large numbers of innocent victims are overcome by receiving 
clerical “sanctions” for the use of these weapons.  Osama Bin Ladin’s seeking of clerical 
sanctions to use nuclear weapons has been widely reported and al Qaeda has publicized 
to their followers that religious advisors have approved the use of these weapons against 
infidels.  The radical Muslim scholar Sheik Nasir bin Hamad al-Fahd has published a 
treatise justifying the use of weapons of mass destruction and the indiscriminate killing of 
civilians.51 
Hoffman has pointed out that the new generation of religiously inspired terrorists, 
with their deliberately less cohesive organizational structures and opaque command and 
control relationships, represent a different and potentially more lethal threat than more 
traditional terrorist adversaries.52  The moral, psychological, and political constraints that 
have kept ethno-national groups or left-wing international terrorists from using these 
weapons will not prevent the new generation of religious terrorists from using them.   
I. TERRORIST GROUP ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
John Arquilla is recognized for his leading role in the application of network 
theory to explain the structure of terrorist organizations and other non-traditionally 
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structured, non-hierarchical groups.  The loose network structure of the organizations of 
these groups that Arguilla describes as waging “netwar” will make it more difficult to 
predict their behavior or defend against it.  “These protagonists are likely to consist of 
dispersed organizations, small groups and individuals who communicate, coordinate and 
conduct their campaigns in an internetted manner, often without precise command and 
control.”53  The decentralized decision making, tactics, and strategies make analysis of 
the group’s possible actions extremely complicated.  The planning, financing, operational 
tactics, and target selection may be entirely carried out by a small local group.  Their 
actions may seem to be “irrational” or in opposition to what is assumed to be the main 
group’s or movement’s overall strategy.  Even if the leadership of al Qaeda opposed the 
use of radiological weapons, the autonomous cells they are inspiring may act on their 
own to employ such a weapon.  Tactics are no longer “approved” by a central command 
or leader as they have been in the past.  At the local level, availability of materials, 
technical skill, and cost may drive the decision to use an RDD.  As a recent RAND study 
on terrorist targeting preferences noted, there are myriad sources of material inside the 
United States in research stations, medical facilities (particularly radio-therapy clinics), 
and commercial sites that could be used for this purpose.54  These venues lack the type of 
rigorous security found at military installations and nuclear power plants.55 
Homegrown terrorists, such as the seven individuals recently arrested in Miami 
for plotting to blow up the Sears Tower in Chicago, may have no real direct connection to 
groups such as al Qaeda but are simply inspired to launch terrorist attacks by propaganda 
disseminated through the internet.56  They are al Qaeda loyalists, but have not physically 
interacted with other members of the organization.57  While this group may not pose as 
significant a threat as first reported, they are representative of the fourth generation 
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warfare we will have to confront in the 21st century.58  Dealing with networks that 
represent a “movement” rather than a terrorist organization will challenge us to craft new 
and appropriate prevention strategies, military responses, and foreign policy.  The 
increased diversity of the decision makers may influence target selection, tactics, and 
weapon selection to a much greater extent than has been seen in traditionally organized 
terrorist groups.  
J. THREATENED USES OF RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 
One group that has threatened the use of radiological devices is the Chechen 
resistance movement.  During 1995 and 1996, Shamil Basayev made a series of threats to 
detonate containers of radioactive material in Russian cities.59 Basayev is the principal 
military leader of the Islamic elements of the Chechen resistance. In a televised threat, he 
displayed containers of material that he claimed were radioactive. Basayev appeared to 
be using the threat of an RDD as a psychological warfare tactic.  In 1996, he told Russian 
authorities where to find a container of cesium-137 that he had buried in Moscow’s 
Izmailovskiy Park.60 
In addition to the arrest of Jose Padilla for allegedly planning a dirty bomb attack, 
a second separate group of Islamic terrorists with links to al Qaeda was arrested by 
British authorities in August 2004 for planning to conduct dirty bombs attacks in 
England.  The leader of the group, Dhiren Barot, had traveled to America to conduct 
reconnaissance on major U.S. financial sites.61  In addition to Barot, six other suspects 
were recently convicted in connection with this plot. 
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K. GOIANIA, BRAZIL 
There have been no documented explosions of a radiological dispersal device by 
terrorists.  A radiological incident in Gioania, Brazil in 1987 has been used by researchers 
as an illustration of the possible effects of the use of a radiological weapon against a 
civilian population.  A radiation cancer treatment center, the Instituto Gioania de 
Radioterapia, moved to a new location leaving a radiation therapy unit behind.  The tele-
therapy unit contained cesium 137.  The center was licensed by the Brazilian government 
for sealed sources. Two scrap metal hunters disassembled the unit and removed the 
source.  The source material glowed blue in the dark.  Several rice size pieces of the 
material were distributed to families.  The source assembly unit was sold to a scrap metal 
dealer.  The source material consisted of 1400 Ci of cesium chloride salt.62   
Several people quickly became ill after being externally exposed or internally 
contaminated from eating after handling the material.  Tragically, some of the children 
spread the material over their skin after being fascinated by how it glowed in the dark.  
As more people fell ill, an alert doctor recognized the symptoms of radiation poisoning.  
The incident resulted in one of the worse radiation accidents on record.  Four 
people died, and an additional 249 were found to be contaminated.  The incident caused 
widespread panic and more than 112,000 people sought radiation testing.  A large testing 
facility was set up in the city’s Olympic Stadium to handle the crowds.  The immediate 
area of contamination was roughly forty city blocks.  Eighty-five homes in this area were 
found to be significantly contaminated.  Through routine travel, people coming into 
contact with the material contaminated homes 100 miles away. 
A large environmental cleanup of the area was conducted at a cost of twenty 
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avoided the region.  The total economic damages were estimated to be in the hundreds of 
millions of dollars.  Long-term health effects were found in the population in the form of 
greatly increased cancer rates.63  
The most significant result of this incident was its profound psychological effect, 
causing fear and depression in the city’s residents.  Many people feared they were 
contaminated or irradiated and would suffer incurable diseases.  More than 8,000 people 
requested monitoring for contamination in order to obtain certificates that they were not 
contaminated.64  These were needed because operators of commercial aircraft and buses 
would refuse to allow people from the region to board due to fear of contamination.  
Hotels would also not allow people from this region to register without a certificate.  The 
incident has so profoundly psychologically affected the area that the international symbol 
for radioactivity has been incorporated into the region’s flag.65 
This is strikingly similar to the effects found after the 1986 Chernobyl accident in 
Russia.  “Radiophobia” or “Chernobyl Syndrome” swept across Russia after the 
accident.66  The resulting fear and depression grew rather than diminished over the years 
and still affects the population.  The accident revealed the inherent danger of sealed 
sources.  So-called “orphaned” or abandoned sources exist in the United States just as 
they do in other countries.   
L. THE ALEXANDER LITVINENKO CASE 
The recent murder of Alexander Litvinenko by poisoning with the radioactive 
isotope polonium 210 may be the first case of state-sponsored radiological terrorism.  It is 
certain to draw the attention of terrorists.  The case caused a sensation in Britain and led 
to thousands of people seeking testing for radiation exposure.  A total of fifteen people 
were found to have been exposed to sufficient levels of polonium 210 to warrant a health 
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risk and are being treated.  The investigation revealed that twelve locations and two 
planes tested positive for radiation and had to undergo decontamination procedures.  
Polonium 210 is a highly radioactive isotope with a relatively short half-life of 138 days.  
It is used commercially in extremely small quantities.  Almost all of the polonium 210 
produced in the world is manufactured in Russian nuclear reactors and then distributed by 
licensed western commercial distributors.  The amount of polonium that was used to 
poison Litvinenko was many times greater than what was needed as a fatal dose.  
Polonium 210 is expensive to manufacture; the monetary value of the amount of the 
substance used to kill Litvinenko was several million dollars.   
The investigation is still active but several factors indicate state involvement.  The 
link to Russia of the exposed aircraft; the two suspected former Russian Federal Security 
Service agents that Litvinenko met with in a London hotel; the substance itself, which is 
produced in Russia; and the fact that the means of death may have been intended as a 
message to the Russian expatriate community in Britain.  (The two former FSB agents 
are also both reportedly being treated for acute radiation exposure in Russia.  British 
authorities recently announced that they would seek to extradite one of the former FSB 
agents, Andrei Lugovoy, and charge him with the murder of Litvinenko).67   
If the assassination of Litvinenko was carried out on the Kremlin’s behalf, it 
would certainly be an act of political terrorism.  Polonium 210 is one of the isotopes that 
has been identified as being the most effective in creating a RDD.  The Litvinenko 
murder-by-radiation poisoning serves as an example to potential terrorists of the 
widespread media coverage to be gained from using radiological materials, the intense 
fear that resulted in thousands seeking to be tested after they believed they had been 
exposed, and the lingering psychological effects that have resulted from the incident.  
One former intelligence officer, Mark Galeotti, called the case an example of the “theater 
of assassination” where the method of killing by using a radioactive isotope was meant to 
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be a big media story and was clearly designed as a warning to the exiled Russian 
community in Britain that they are not beyond the Kremlin’s reach.68  
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III.  THE NEW POLICE ROLE IN DOMESTIC 
COUNTERTERRORISM 
Since the 9/11 attacks, there has been much discussion on what role local police 
agencies should have in homeland security.  How can the more than 700,000 local police 
officers and 18,000 state and local police agencies best protect their communities and 
contribute to securing the nation as a whole from terrorist attacks?69  New potential 
terrorist threats involving radiological, biological, and chemical agents have emerged.  A 
“dirty bomb” or radiological dispersal device has been identified as a low tech, high 
threat option for terrorist groups.   
In addition to new counterterrorism responsibilities, police departments 
nationwide are dealing with a resurgence of violent crime.  Boston had a 23 percent 
increase in homicides over the last two years, Philadelphia 22.4 and Seattle 25 percent.70  
The police have adapted their roles and style of policing over the years in response to 
changes in the community, technological advances, rising crime rates, public pressure, 
and judicial decisions.  A new pressure, to defend and protect against terrorist attacks has 
been added since 9/11.  As police develop strategies to handle their increased 
responsibilities, it is useful to review the evolution of local policing and the development 
of current community policing philosophy that guiding the majority of today’s local law 
enforcement organizations. 
A. HISTORY OF COMMUNITY POLICING 
Community policing traces its roots back to the creation of modern policing in 
New York, Philadelphia, and Boston in the mid-1850s.  Formal structured law 
enforcement organizations were created in these cities based on the principles of Sir 
Robert Peel. 
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In 1829, Peel won approval from Parliament of a bill to create the London 
Metropolitan Police force.  There was considerable fear of a police agency that would 
serve as an arm of the state to repress political opposition and curtail civil liberties.  
Peel’s principles of law enforcement clearly established the police as members of the 
community: “The police are the public and the public are the police71.”  The mission of 
the police was to prevent crimes from occurring.  Another, often overlooked, 
recommendation of Peel’s was the assignment of police officers to regular beats, defined 
geographic areas of responsibility.  The French model of a national police force was 
rejected and local independent police departments were created.  America adopted the 
British model of policing.   
B. POLITICAL ERA 
Kelling and Moore describe three generally accepted periods in the development 
of modern American policing: the Political Era, the Reform Era, and the Community-
Based Era.72  The Political Era of policing began in the early 1900s as part of the spoils 
system of the early ward boss era.  Politicians and political parties sought control over the 
police for the patronage system.  Jobs in the police department were valued and were 
given out as political favors to supporters.  The role of the police was still firmly rooted 
in the community.  Police officers patrolled the cities primarily on foot. 
The early city police provided a variety of services for the public and in many 
ways were the first governmental social services agency.  The police in New York and 
Boston ran soup kitchens and fed the poor.  They housed vagrants (the early homeless) 
and kept delinquents in order.  The police dispensed “justice” informally often at the end 
of a nightstick, as opposed to in a courtroom.  However, corruption was rampant in 
policing as it was across all levels of city government.   
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C. THE REFORM ERA 
In 1931, the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement 
(popularly known as the Wickersham Commission after its chairman, former Attorney 
General George W. Wickersham) recommended a number of reforms in policing to 
President Hoover.  The Commission’s Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement 
detailed a host of brutal police practices (such as “the third degree” and other forms of 
torture during police interrogations) and pointed to the corrupting influence of political 
machine domination of police departments.73  The Commission sought to reduce political 
influence in policing and professionalize the police with training and modern 
organizational principles.   
Professional police practices were championed by Berkeley, California Police 
Chief August Vollmer and Chicago Police Superintendent O.W. Wilson during the 
1930s.  Their theory on reforming police departments was to separate the police from 
corrupting influences in the community and have the police patrol in cars as opposed to 
on foot.  Police reformers sought to lessen political influence and control over police 
agencies.   
Patrol cars were to rapidly respond to calls for service by the use of radio 
dispatchers.  Traditional retrospective criminal investigations by detectives were an 
important crime fighting strategy.  Police organizations could be centralized and the 
professionalism of policing using modern scientific methods was emphasized.  The role 
of police officers became “crime fighters.”  The mission of policing was crime control. 
These theories of policing remained dominant for the next forty years.74  The 
professional model of policing still exists in many agencies. 
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D. THE COMMUNITY PROBLEM SOLVING ERA 
Following the riots and social upheaval of the 1960’s, it was increasingly 
recognized that “divorcing” the police from the community was a bad idea.  The release 
of the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice in 
1967 called attention to the need for the police to be more accountable to the public and 
to increase communication with the community.75  Supreme Court decisions such as 
Miranda v. Arizona and Mapp v. Ohio forced changes in police procedures. 
Several significant research experiments on the efficacy of police patrol tactics 
were conducted during the 1970s.  The most significant was the Kansas City (Missouri) 
Preventive Patrol Experiment in 1973; its findings seriously challenged the beliefs of the 
professional model of policing.  Preventive patrol was found to have little or no effect on 
reported crime, victimization rates, or citizens’ perception of personal safety.76  A study 
by the RAND Corporation on criminal investigations found that traditional detective 
work contributed little to investigations of property crime.77  Patrol officers made the 
arrests and usually discovered any evidence that lead to future arrests during their initial 
response.   
The experiments of Neighborhood Foot Patrol in Flint, Michigan, the Citizen 
Oriented Police Experiment in Baltimore County, Maryland and the research on Problem-
Oriented Policing in Newport News, Virginia showed that the community oriented 
approach led not only to greater citizen satisfaction but also the involved officers reported 
to be more satisfied with the new approaches.78  Two theories by respected 
criminologists, Herman Goldstein’s “problem oriented policing” approach and Kelling’s  
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and Wilson’s “Broken Windows” theory on fear and disorder were embraced by police 
officials and began the transformation of police agencies into “community policing” 
organizations. 
E. INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING 
The term “intelligence-led policing” is being increasingly used in police circles.  
While there is not currently a uniformly accepted definition of the term, and debate 
continues as to what it actually is, there is a growing consensus that the term describes 
police efforts to collect and analyze information to produce intelligence that will guide 
police decision making at the tactical and strategic levels.  A  basic definition is provided 
by Ratcliffe: “Intelligence-led policing is the application of criminal intelligence analysis 
as an objective decision making tool in order to facilitate crime reduction and prevention 
through effective policing strategies and external partnership projects drawn from an 
evidential base.”79   
The concept was first used in the United Kingdom in 1997 to describe the police 
operational practices of the Kent Constabulary to deal with a rising crime rate.  The focus 
was on an increased use of intelligence, surveillance, and informants to target repeat 
offenders. The philosophical concept draws on both problem-oriented policing for the 
identification and analysis of root causes of crime and the accountability, geographic 
mapping, and statistical analysis of the crime data of CompStat.80  The term and the new 
intelligence-driven philosophy of policing was quickly adopted by police agencies in not 
only England but in Australia, Canada, and the United States following the September 11 
attacks.  
There have been previous recommendations for establishing intelligence-led 
policing at the local and state police level by the International Association of Chiefs of 
Police in Criminal Intelligence Sharing:  A National Plan for Intelligence-Led Policing 
At the Local, State and Federal Levels, and by the U.S. Department of Justice in 
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Intelligence-Led Policing:  The New Intelligence Architecture.  While there is certainly a 
need for establishing a national intelligence plan for law enforcement, these plans 
recognize the longstanding barriers that hinder intelligence sharing; the different policies, 
technologies, and the “hierarchy” within law enforcement and intelligence communities; 
and the capabilities of law enforcement intelligence analysis.81 
There are some concerns that intelligence-led policing may be a step away from 
the community policing model.  Intelligence-led policing has a centralized hierarchical 
organizational command structure as opposed to the decentralized structure of true 
community policing organizations.  Also, intelligence-led policing determines priorities 
through an objective analysis of statistical data and criminal intelligence while 
community policing emphasizes responding to priorities identified by the community.  
Minor quality of life violations that the community favors prioritizing may not receive 
the same level of enforcement and attention under intelligence-led policing.  If the 
community is not the dominant source of police policy, it could create a separation 
between the police and the community.   
Intelligence-led policing can lead to civil liberties concerns, if there are not proper 
safeguards on what information is being collected and stored by police.  Local police 
agencies do not have a good history of respecting the constitutional rights of citizens 
when it comes to intelligence gathering activities.  The “Red Squads” of the 1950s and 
1960s were originally formed as local police intelligence units to gather information on 
suspected communists.82  Their efforts shifted focus to anti-war protesters and civil rights 
groups in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  After a number of violations of civil rights 
were identified by lawsuits and grand jury investigations across the nation, court 
injunctions were issued against many police agencies.  These had a major impact on 
curtailing abuses and many local police agencies reduced police intelligence operations 
and eliminated the practice of creating “files” on individuals.  Since 9/11 the renewed 
emphasis on local police intelligence operations has begun to increase concern by civil 
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libertarians that past abuses will be repeated.  A recent U.S. News and World Report 
investigation identified nearly a dozen questionable instances where local police 
intelligence units conducted surveillance or infiltration, or made arrests of anti-war 
protesters, union activists, or library patrons surfing the web.83  The New York Times has 
revealed that the New York City Police Department’s RNC Intelligence Squad conducted 
extensive surveillance and created hundreds of files on individuals who had no apparent 
intention of breaking the law as they prepared for the 2004 Republican National 
Convention.84 
Intel-led policing could also raise future concerns of an over-reliance on police 
deployment decisions being made on the basis of information provided by criminal 
informants.  These concerns about intelligence-led policing could best be addressed by 
combining the new intelligence-led policing paradigm with the community philosophy 
rather than creating a separate model.  
F. NEW POLICE ROLE: COUNTERTERRORISM 
Police departments across the United States began to greatly increase intelligence 
collection efforts following the 9/11 attacks.  It was quickly realized that not only was 
collection needed, but all of the other steps of the intelligence process cycle – analysis, 
planning, processing, dissemination, and re-evaluation – were needed.  The priority 
placed on intelligence resulted in a resurgence of the police intelligence function.   
A view shared by many police officials is that increasing counterterrorism 
responsibilities will require shifting resources away from community policing. However, 
community policing can be an integral part of a counterterrorism strategy.  In Britain, this 
fact has been recognized for many years; the prevention of terrorism is one of the four 
fundamental goals of their community policing program and is the overarching theme of 
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their National Policing Plan.85  In the UK, community policing is seen as the primary 
means to establish connections to the often isolated Muslim community.  The goals are 
not only to obtain intelligence but to share information with the community, recruit 
Muslims to join the police service, and establish close interactive connections with 
members of the community to ease social tensions.   
In the United States, police officials are beginning to realize the potential of 
community policing as an anti-terrorism tool.  Community policing officers have shown 
that they are experts at collecting information on criminal activity such as drug dealing 
and gang activity from neighborhood residents who have learned to trust their community 
policing officers.  These officers can be trained to recognize information that is of 
intelligence value for counter-terrorism and can educate the community on signs of 
potential terrorist activity.  Besides collecting information, they can also reduce the 
public’s unwarranted fear of terrorism by sharing information on the realities of terrorist 
threats.  Community policing officers were used successfully following 9/11 to deal with 
fear and rumor management concerning neighborhood mosques and possible retaliation 
against innocent Muslim Americans.   
Intelligence-led policing may even be the key to greater use of the community 
policing philosophy to fight terrorism.  Intelligence-led policing can help to integrate 
community policing and law enforcement intelligence. The greatest amount of 
intelligence of value will come from the strong community relationships that community 
policing creates.  As the UK discovered following the London Subway Bombings of 7/7, 
“homegrown” terrorists who have been radicalized by Islamic extremists may be the 
greatest threat on the horizon.  In the U.S., this phenomenon may be on the rise also.  The 
recent arrest of a New Hampshire man who converted to Islam and allegedly participated 
in terrorist activities in Somalia shows how radicalization could also pose a future 
problem for the United States.86 
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In the wake of the attacks on the London subway system, British authorities 
developed a new model of counter-terrorism.  A revised Terrorism Act was passed by 
Parliament in April 2006 which amended and expanded previous anti-terrorism 
legislation.  It made “glorification of terrorism,” “dissemination of terrorist publications,” 
and “training for terrorism” criminal offenses and expanded police powers to detain 
terrorist suspects for up to twenty-eight days.87  The plan also emphasized that the 
primary strategy of the police would be to emphasize community policing principles in 
Muslim neighborhoods and form partnerships with Muslim groups.  Sir Ian Blair, the 
chief of the Metropolitan Police, has described the goals of the effort to use community 
policing principles to facilitate information sharing, build trust in the community for 
police operations and arrests, and mitigate the negative impact of enforcement efforts 
within the Muslim community.88     
G. REGIONAL INTELLIGENCE CENTERS 
One of the most significant post 9/11 developments for state and local police 
agencies was the creation of state and regional fusion centers or intelligence centers.  
These centers were not mandated by the Department of Homeland Security but have been 
quickly adopted by DHS and recognized as a key element of a new national intelligence 
network.  There are currently thirty-eight intelligence centers operating in the states and 
major Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) regions.89  Los Angeles recently opened the 
Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC) in Norwalk, California.  The center houses 
federal, state, and local police in one facility to improve intelligence sharing and anti-
terror collaboration. There are many variations of these intelligence centers; some focus 
strictly on counterterrorism while others pursue an “all crimes, all hazards” approach.  
The Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security have published a 
set of Fusion Center Guidelines to assist in the establishment, development, and 
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operation of these centers.  The guidelines define a fusion center as a “collaborative effort 
of two or more agencies that provide resources, expertise and/or information to the center 
with the goal of maximizing the ability to detect, prevent, investigate and respond to 
criminal and terrorist activity.”90   
These regional intelligence centers have the capability to “fuse” various databases 
from law enforcement along with information from nontraditional collectors of 
intelligence such as private sector organizations (risk assessments and suspicious activity 
reports, etc.) and non-law enforcement public safety organizations into meaningful 
intelligence.91  Regional intelligence centers will be the key for incorporating the private 
sector into a coordinated homeland security strategy.  The intelligence centers will serve 
as the analytical hub for collecting, processing, and disseminating information to 
consumers both horizontally and vertically.  Regional intelligence centers have the ability 
to break down traditional barriers to information sharing and develop intelligence led 
policing into the new version of community policing for the twenty first century.  
H. COMMUNITY BASED COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY 
In the United States, there is growing recognition of the important role that 
community policing can play in preventing terrorism but the strategy has not been 
adopted as part of a national counter-terrorism strategy.  Community policing can be used 
not only for intelligence gathering and information sharing but to address future possible 
Islamic radicalization of Muslim youth.  The police have adapted to new roles in the past 
and have been shown to be natural problem solvers.  While rising crime rates will 
continue to task police resources, re-defining community policing initiatives as counter-
terrorism activities will not add significant costs to police operations.      
The community policing philosophy has been expanded in the UK to include 
public and private partnerships along with community partnerships to fight terrorism.  In 
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Britain, the Home Office recently urged police to work with university authorities to 
prevent Muslim students from getting involved with radical religious groups.  Several top 
universities have been penetrated by radical Islamic groups.  As part of their partnership, 
Scotland Yard officials toured some of the universities which have nuclear research 
laboratories and made recommendations on increasing security to prevent theft of 
radioactive material.92  These types of public-private partnerships can also be capitalized 
on in the United States where 85 percent of critical infrastructure and key resources are 
privately owned.  Although not traditionally thought of as communities, the educational, 
medical, and industrial laboratories where radiological materials are stored could benefit 
from law enforcement expanding traditional community partnerships.  
In America, we’ve taken a decidedly different approach than the European 
democracies in militarizing our counter-terrorism strategy.  We are fighting a “war on 
terror” but our front line troops domestically are our local law enforcement officers.  I 
recommend a strategy which focuses on using community policing as the basis for our 
counter-terrorism strategy.  Human intelligence gathering, data sharing, interagency and 
interdisciplinary partnerships, the coordinated deployment of resources, and developing 
close working relationships with the community will be enhanced.  Intelligence-led 
policing will focus law enforcement efforts on preventive, proactive strategies as opposed 
to the reactive, traditional after-the-fact investigative approaches of the past.  New 
partnerships with private security at the local police level can serve to increase security 
for dangerous radioactive material and these partnerships can increase local police 
intelligence capabilities.  Ultimately our national security may rely on strengthening our 
neighborhood security.   
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Table 2.   Three Historical Era’s of Law Enforcement Evolution [From Kelling and 
Moore]93 
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IV. SECURITY OF SOURCES 
In the United States, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission oversees the safety and 
security of nuclear reactors and licenses ownership of radioactive sources.  There are two 
types of licenses which govern the more than two million radioactive sources in the 
United States: General and Specific. General licenses apply to the less hazardous sources.  
Approximately 135,000 companies are general licensees and these account for 
approximately 1.8 million low level radioactive sources.94  These sources do not pose a 
high security concern.  Specific licenses are issued to provide stricter controls over the 
more hazardous radioactive sources that are used in medicine, research, and industry.  
There are a little over 20,000 specific licenses.95   
 
 
Figure 1.   NRC Sealed Sources Licensees [From GAO-03-804]96. 
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Within this group of specific licenses, a smaller subset of sources containing 
amounts the Nuclear Regulatory Commission describes as being of increased concern 
pose a true security risk.  These specific sources could be used to create a RDD or dirty 
bomb.  The NRC and the Department of Energy have formed a materials security 
working group to categorize sealed sources by their level of risk.97  The NRC and the 
agreement states have also formed a working group that has identified approximately 
2,100 licensees to be in the greatest risk group based on the type and quantity of material.   
The 9/11 attacks on America resulted in an across-the-board reassessment of our 
nation’s security.  The continuing terrorist threat to America prompted the NRC to revisit 
the existing controls for radioactive materials.  The NRC communicates directives to its 
licensees primarily through two means: Advisories and Orders.  Advisories are non-
public rapidly disseminated information bulletins from the intelligence community or law 
enforcement agencies on the threat environment and guidance to strengthen their 
capabilities against the threat.98  Orders are regulatory requirements that modify, revoke, 
or suspend licenses or require specific actions by the licensee.99  Following the 9/11 
attacks, the NRC issued new increased controls for radioactive materials that, for the first 
time, designate a role for local law enforcement in the security of radiological materials.   
Effective June 2, 2006, licensees with radioactive material of quantities of 
concern would be subject to increased controls.  The United States Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission issued an order for increased controls for radioactive sources “to reduce the 
risk of unauthorized use of radioactive materials, through access controls to aid 
prevention, and prompt detection, assessment and response to mitigate potentially high 
consequences that would be detrimental to public health and safety.” 100  
The increased controls from the NRC for the first time recognize the role of local 
law enforcement agencies in radioactive materials security.  The requirements are for 
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licensees who possess sufficient quantities of concerns (see chart) “to respond 
immediately to any actual or attempted theft, sabotage or diversion of such radioactive 
material or devices.”101  The response requires the licensee to request assistance from the 
local law enforcement agency (LLEA).   
The increased controls also require the licensee “to have a pre-arranged plan with 
LLEA for assistance in response to an actual or attempted theft, sabotage or diversion of 
such radioactive materials or devices.  The complexity of the plan must be consistent in 
scope and timing with a realistic potential vulnerability of the sources containing such 
material.”102  The NRC controls require the radioactive material licensees to collaborate 
with local law enforcement on their response plans.  The plans have to be documented 
and must be based on realistic risk assessments.  The material describing licensee-
specific measures to meet these orders is considered Sensitive Unclassified Non-
Safeguards Information (SUNSI) and is to be withheld from public disclosure.103 
The NRC’s regulatory scheme is portrayed in Figure 1.  The NRC delegates its 
authority to regulate quantities of radioactive materials to states under the Agreement 
States Program under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.104  Today, thirty-four states, or 
approximately 75 percent of the states, have entered into agreements with the governor 
and chairman of the NRC accepting regulatory responsibility from the NRC.  In the 
remaining states, the NRC directly regulates licensees that possess radioactive materials.   
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Figure 2.   How the NRC Regulates [From the U.S. NRC]105  
This diagram gives an overview of NRC's regulatory process which has five main 
components: (1) developing regulations and guidance for our applicants and licensees, (2) 
licensing or certifying applicants to use nuclear materials or operate nuclear facilities or 
decommissioning that permits license termination, (3) overseeing licensee operations and 
facilities to ensure that licensees comply with safety requirements, (4) evaluating 
operational experience at licensed facilities or involving licensed activities, and (5) 
conducting research, holding hearings to address the concerns of parties affected by 
agency decisions, and obtaining independent reviews to support our regulatory 
decisions.106 
A. ORPHANED SOURCES 
Radioactive sources that are not under institutional controls because of being lost, 
stolen, or abandoned are called orphaned sources.107  Every year approximately 250 
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radioactive sources are reported to be stolen, lost, or abandoned in the United States.108  
Within the last ten years the Nuclear Regulatory Commission reports that companies 
have lost track of more than 1,500 radioactive sources in the United States and more than 
half (56 percent) were never recovered.109  The director of the Domestic Nuclear 
Detection Office of the Department of Homeland Security reports that incidents being 
reported to United States intelligence officials of material being stolen, offered for sale, 
or lost has more than doubled since the 1990s.110   
The problem exists not only in the United States but worldwide, particularly in the 
former Soviet Union.   The Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
recently urged the world to step up efforts to protect nuclear material from falling into 
terrorists’ hands and revealed that his agency has recorded more than 650 attempts to 
smuggle radiological material in the last ten years.111  Efforts are being made both 
nationally and internationally to increase the tracking and security of source materials 
from the “cradle to the grave.”112   Table 3 from the International Atomic Energy 
Association shows incidents of weapons-usable material reported to be missing or 
suspected of being stolen.  Ferguson, Kazi, and Perera have argued in a recent study, 
“Commercial Radioactive Sources:  Surveying the Security Risks,” that security efforts 
need to be focused on the smaller subset of highly radioactive materials that are not kept 
in secure settings and pose a true danger to be used in RDD’s by terrorists.113 
 
 
                                                 
108 United States General Accounting Office, “Nuclear Security:  Federal and State Action Needed to 
Improve Security of Radioactive Sources,” GAO-03-804, August 2003, 6. 
109 International Atomic Energy Agency, “Inadequate Control of World’s Radioactive Sources,” June 
24, 2002, www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/2002/prn/0209.shtml, [Accessed June 11, 2007]. 
110 Richard Willing, “Nuclear Traffic Doubles Since ‘90’s,” USA Today, December 25, 2005. 
111 Thomas Wagner, “ElBaradei:  Protect Nuclear Material,” Associated Press, December 6th, 2006, 
http://www.iiss.org/index.asp, [Accessed June 4, 2007]. 
112 International Atomic Energy Agency. 
113 Ferguson, et al, “Commercial Radioactive Sources,” 24. 
 42
Table 3.   Confirmed Incidents with Nuclear Material, 1993-2001 [From IAEA]114 
 
 









1993      1     32   33 
1994      6     40   46 
1995      3     21   24 
1996      0     16   16 
1997      0     15   15 
1998      0     11   11 
1999      2     10   12 
2000      3     10   13 
2001      3     13   16 
Total     18    168  186 
 
B. DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE 
The president directed the establishment of the Domestic Nuclear Detection 
Office in April 2005, in National Security Presidential Directive 43 / Homeland Security 
Directive 14, to coordinate the national effort to protect the United States from nuclear 
and radiological threats.  The office of domestic nuclear detection is located within the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the DNDO director reports to the Secretary 
of Homeland Security.  The mission of the office is to address a broad range of 
radiological and nuclear protective measures primarily centered around the acquisition 
and support to deployment of a domestic nuclear detection system.  The office is staffed 
with representatives from various federal agencies and state and local governments.  One 
of the missions of the office is to encourage the enhancement of effective sharing of 
information and the use of nuclear detection information and intelligence.115   
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C. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY  
The United States Department of Energy (DOE) is another federal agency that is 
actively involved in the security of nuclear materials.  The DOE protects the nation’s 
nuclear facilities, weapons, and materials owned or operated by the DOE and directs 
intelligence and counter-intelligence against threats including terrorism.  The Department 
of Energy, through its National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), is an integral 
part of the United States’ efforts to reduce global danger from radiological and nuclear 
material through the Global Threat Reduction Initiative.116  In addition to international 
efforts, the NNSA runs a domestic source recovery program through the Los Alamos 
National Laboratory to remove and securely manage radioactive materials that could be 
at risk for theft or diversion for use in a radiological dispersal device.   
The NNSA actively pursues materials that pose a national security risk.  Recently, 
in Plymouth, Massachusetts, after concerns were raised by Massachusetts Health officials 
concerning a business that failed to properly secure a quantity of cesium-137, the NNSA 
removed the material which they said could have been used to make a radiological 
dispersal device.  NNSA officials announced that, to date, “the program has recovered 
more than 13,000 sources, enough material to make more than 1,400 potent dirty bombs 
– from over 500 facilities.”117    
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is another federal agency that has a 
program to secure orphaned sources in the United States.  The EPA’s Orphaned Source 
Initiative was the first national program devoted to the control of these sources.  The EPA 
initiative works to identify, secure, and remove materials at municipal waste management 
sites, steel mills, and scrap yards.118 
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D. FACILITY SECURITY 
The security of facilities containing sealed sources has been questioned by both 
CRS and GAO investigative reports.  The security of these sources typically contained in 
medical or research facilities have been found to vary widely, from extensive security 
measures to unlocked and unguarded.119  Private security is responsible for protecting 
this material.  The private security industry has been beset by low pay, low or no 
standards, and little or no training.120  Physical security of radiological materials at 
hospitals has been identified by the GAO as particularly troublesome.121  A recent special 
report in Jane’s Security and Terrorism Monitor describes the enforcement of United 
States laws and regulations surrounding the storage, sale and shipment of radiological 
source material as “notoriously lax.”122    
Even at university sites where there are nuclear reactors, the security of facilities 
has been questioned.  The ABC Primetime television news show recently aired an expose 
on security at the twenty-five nuclear research reactors on college campuses across the 
country.  Two ABC interns, posing as visiting students, were allowed to tour and video 
the nuclear reactor at Kansas State University, despite university regulations requiring 
background checks and no cameras.  The women reported that they had free reign of the 
reactor and that there were no guards or metal detectors present; a closed circuit TV 
system appeared to be the only security measure in place.123   
While the NRC issued its first security advisory order to the nation’s seventy 
large irradiator facilities following 9/11, these industrial facilities typically have thick 
concrete walls and interlocking doors for radiation security in addition to extensive 
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security alarms.  Other sealed source users in less secure settings pose a greater risk of 
theft.  The licensing and inspection system of these sources has been criticized as being 
susceptible to fraud.124   Certain radioactive isotopes such as cobalt-60, cesium-137, 
iridium-192 and americium-241 pose a greater risk since they have properties which 
make them attractive to use by terrorists in a dirty bomb.  Table 4 shows the 
radionuclides of concern from the NRC.  
 
Table 4.   Values [From the NRC]125 
Table 4: Radionuclides of Concern 




Am-241 0.6 16 
Am-241/Be 0.6 16 
Cf-252 0.2 5.4 
Cm-244 0.5 14 
Co-60 0.3 8.1 
Cs-137 1 27 
Gd-153 10 270 
lr-192 0.8 22 
Pm-147 400 11,000 
Pu-238 0.6 16 
Pu-239/Be 0.6 16 
Se-75 2 54 
Sr-90 (Y-90) 10 270 
Tm-170 200 5,400 
Yb-169 3 81 
 
In 2003, The Los Alamos National Laboratory conducted a study on reducing the 
potential use of radiological source materials in radiation dispersal devices.  The study 
recommends focusing on the large and potentially hazardous radiological source 
materials as a means to reduce the RDD threat.  Using open source and International 
Atomic Energy Association databases the lab examined the entire life cycle of material: 
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production, sales, transportation, users, disposition (including orphaned sources), waste 
consolidation sites, and waste disposal sites.126  By cross-comparing the vulnerabilities 
associated with large radiological source applications at various points in the life cycle, 
the authors created a Source Status Concern Index (SSCI) that represented data on the 
radioactivity, hazard factor, accessibility, and security factor.  Based on this analysis, the 
highest risk reduction priorities were identified.  Transportation of cobalt-60 sources and 
teletherapy source user facilities (hospital cancer treatment centers) were at the top of the 
vulnerability list.127 
 
Figure 3.   Source Status Concern Index [From Los Alamos National Lab]128 
There is disagreement between the agreement states and the NRC on the 
appropriate role of the states in regulating sealed sources.  A GAO study found that 82 
percent of the states indicated they want to have responsibility for inspection and 
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enforcement of security measures for sealed sources.129  The NRC and many of the 
agreement states do not carry out inspections before specific licenses are granted and wait 
for as much as a year after licenses are granted to inspect facilities.  Another problem that 
has been identified by the GAO is that many agreement states lack adequate measures for 
enforcing existing standards and many were unable to identify the number of sources 
within their jurisdictions.130  The NRC has issued orders to increase security of sealed 
sources of quantities of concerns.  These security orders are not public information.  The 
orders instructed licensees to: 
1) Install additional physical barriers. 
2) Enhance coordination with law enforcement. 
3) Create more restrictive site access controls.131 
The 9/11 Commission report highlighted four kinds of failures in decreasing the 
risk of terrorism: imagination, policy, capabilities, and management.132 Local police 
departments have played a very limited role in the past in radiological security, 
responding only after thefts or incidents have already occurred.  This research suggests a 
need to create new collaborative partnerships with our private partners in the radiation 
industry, government regulators, and our local public safety community in order to 
protect our country from potential terrorist uses of radiological material and to develop 
and share intelligence on preventing terrorists from acquiring this material.  The controls 
which are mandated for the licensees, and not the local law enforcement agencies, create 
an opportunity to create a new network for radiation security in cities.  This strategy 
proposes utilizing law enforcement’s community policing foundation to develop a 
public/private collaboration focused on radiation security.   
                                                 
129 GAO-03-804, 6. 
130 Government Accountability Office (GAO), U.S. and International Efforts to Control Sealed 
Radioactive Sources Need Strengthening, GAO-03-638 (Washington, DC: GAO, August 2003), 9. 
131 Massachusetts Department of Public Health, Radiation Control Program, “Increased Controls.” 
132 Thomas H. Kean, Chair, The 9/11 Commission Report, Final Report of the National Commission 
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York: Norton and Company, July 2004), 339. 
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V.  POLICY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION 
A. POLICE ROLE IN RADIOLOGICAL SECURITY 
Local police agencies since 9/11 have taken on new roles in anti-terrorism and 
critical infrastructure protection without increases in staffing.  In fact, many police 
agencies have fewer officers than they did on 9/11.133  These officers have had to deal 
with an increase in violent crime in major cities across the United States.134 The Boston 
Police Department, through attrition, has 300 fewer officers now than in 2001, primarily 
due to budget issues and reduced federal grants.  The New York City Police Department 
shrunk from a high of 40,078 officers in 2000 to 36,284 uniformed officers as of June 
2007.135  This research has identified the problem of lax security for radiological isotopes 
which could be used to construct an RDD.  Local police agencies have not traditionally 
been involved with the security of radioactive sources. 
How can police agencies deal with new homeland security responsibilities with 
fewer officers?  One way is to expand through collaboration with private security.  There 
are approximately 600,000 police officers in America but there are over 1.5 million 
private security officers.  Tapping into this network can expand not only security but 
intelligence gathering efforts. Our first line of defense as a nation is intelligence.  Our 
past community policing efforts were built on partnerships.  By creating partnerships 
with the private security who are guarding radioactive materials, we can influence 
protective measures and gather and share intelligence.  What would a proposed strategy 
look like?  
                                                 
133 National Institute of Justice, “Hiring and Keeping Police Officers,” NIJ Research for Practice, July 
2004, NCJ 202289, 2. 
134 Randall Pinkston, “FBI:  Violent Crime on the Rise,” CBS NEWS, June 2, 2007, 
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135 The City of New York, Independent Budget Office, “Testimony of Preston Niblack Deputy 
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B. POLICY OPTIONS ANALYSIS 
There are three primary options for a new local law enforcement role in 
radiological security.   
1. Option A 
The first option is to maintain the status quo.  Local police departments  should 
not take on additional homeland security responsibilities.  Violent crime is up in  major 
cities across the nation.  Staffing levels have decreased in major cities across the  United 
States since 9/11.  Police resources are being diverted from crime fighting to  homeland 
security, while federal assistance to police forces has been greatly reduced.   The licensee 
is responsible for the security of radioactive material and only after the theft  or attempted 
theft of material should police become involved.  The new NRC  requirements for 
licensees to collaborate with local law enforcement on security are  binding on the 
licensee and not the law enforcement agency.    
2. Option B 
The police department recognizes the danger of these materials and seeks  to hold 
security to tighter standards through regulation.  The police can seek additional  
regulatory authority directly over source material through changes in state law or  
municipal ordinance.  Many agreement states have indicated through surveys that they  
lack sufficient personnel to properly enforce licensee compliance with security standards  
through inspections. In order for Option B to be properly implemented, police staffing 
levels would need to be increased.  
3. Option C 
The police department uses this as an opportunity to increase radioactive  material 
security in the city.  Recognizing that these materials are present in large quantities and 
could pose a significant danger if acquired by terrorists, the department – rather than 
simply receiving plans – coordinates and collaborates with facility security to  ensure the 
material is secured properly and law enforcement responds appropriately. The  goal 
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would be to develop a partnership with the private security personnel who physically  
manage security at these facilities.  The police department would use the community 
policing approach to building a radiological security network.    
 
Table 5.   Policy Options Analysis Matrix [Adapted from Bardach] 
Policy 
Alternative 




No High No No No 
Option B 
Regulatory 




Low High High High No 
 
The Policy Options Analysis Matrix is an analytical tool for comparison of 
alternative policies based on evaluative criteria of projected outcomes.136  Each 
alternative is assigned a weighted measure from “no” perceived effect on the criteria to 
“high” effect based on a construct of an outcome analysis of the proposed alternatives.  
The grid allows for a concise distillation of broad policy concepts by applying criteria to 
evaluate options based on projected outcomes.  For example, Policy Option A is to 
continue the present course.  There would be no additional costs to the agency, the 
present trend could continue without alterations, so it would rate as highly sustainable,  
 
 
                                                 
136 Eugene Bardach,  A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis:  The Eightfold Path to More Effective 
Problem Solving, 2nd ed.  (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2005), 46. 
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there would be no increase or decrease in present radiological security, no new 
partnerships would be created, and no legislation would be required to effect the policy 
change.   
C. POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
Option A is essentially to maintain the status quo.  It would be the preferred 
option if it is believed that radiological attack is not a valid threat or that protection of 
radioactive materials is not a local police function.  This option would incur no additional 
costs. However, this paper has demonstrated that terrorist use of radiological materials is 
a legitimate risk to public safety. 
Option B has the police become a formal part of the nuclear regulatory scheme. 
State law or municipal ordinance would have to be enacted to empower police with this 
responsibility.  A concern in the implementation of strategy option B is the increased 
regulatory duties of police officers.  Few people outside of policing realize how many 
regulatory duties, not directly associated with policing, officers have.  Practices vary 
regionally but older police agencies, especially in the Northeast, have a great many 
regulatory functions that they have inherited over the years.  An example in the Boston 
Police Department is the Hackney Carriage Division, which regulates the taxi industry.  
The police department has regulated the hiring of carriages for rides since horse drawn 
carriages began offering rides for money in the late 1800s.  The modern Boston taxi 
industry, with over 1,000 cabs, is entirely regulated by the police department, from the 
testing and licensing of drivers, to the inspection of cabs and the selling of taxi 
medallions.   
Police officers are also agents of the State Alcohol Control Board and enforce and 
inspect for violations in the city’s bars and restaurants.  They also serve as agents for the 
city’s various licensing boards, inspecting and enforcing ordinances relating to 
certificates to sell milk in stores, etc.  Regulatory duties have been found to be relatively 
easy to acquire but impossible to shed.  The radiation industry would obviously object to 
any increase in regulatory oversight.  The goal is to increase the security of materials, not 
to have police replace or become industry regulators.  Once such a role is accepted by the 
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police, there is a danger of them being used in compliance and enforcement efforts as 
legislators attempt to try to increase controls.137  Since 9/11, the homeland security 
responsibilities of law enforcement personnel have grown substantially.  Unfortunately, 
budgets have not and the hiring of officers has suffered.  The City of Boston has 
approximately 300 hundred fewer officers than on 9/11 and the situation is similar in 
many jurisdictions.138  Community policing efforts have suffered and crime is on the 
increase.    
Option C uses the community policing model to increase radiation safety.  
Existing personnel are utilized.  There would be some additional future training costs for 
the private security personnel and police officers in radiological security (costs that may 
be recoverable through homeland security grants).  Establishing a collaborative 
relationship with our private security partners will have an added benefit for the Police 
Department in terms of developing and sharing intelligence.  The intelligence officers 
could also provide critical information for target hardening and other aspects of the 
security plan.  Intelligence can properly assess and quantify the threat, vulnerability, and 
consequence factors that security needs to develop a proper plan. The period when 
terrorists are conducting their pre-operational surveillance is the best opportunity for 
security to uncover and prevent the theft of material.   
If laws enforcement personnel become industry regulators, the overall goal of 
developing partnerships may suffer, as the police would eventually be viewed as 
compliance officers rather than collaborators.  Trust is a necessary component of 
partnership and undoubtedly it would suffer if the industry believed that police were 
trying to punish them for violations as opposed to working with them.  Similarly, 
intelligence efforts are much more likely to be successful if they are based on developing 
partnerships as opposed to the police becoming overseers.  Option C, the community 
policing approach to radiological security, is the policy recommended by this research.  It 
                                                 
137 Malcolm K. Sparrow, The Regulatory Craft, Controlling Risks, Solving Problems and Managing 
Compliance (Washington DC:  Brooking Institute Press, 2000), 35. 
138 James Alan Fox, “Wall Needed Between Politics and Policing:  President’s Commitment to 
Constabulary is Cop-Out,” Boston Herald, July 17, 2006, 23. 
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provides the most comprehensive approach and the most value in terms of operational 
effectiveness, cost effectiveness, and sustainability of the policy alternatives. 
D. THE FOUR ACTIONS FRAMEWORK: ELIMINATE, RAISE, REDUCE, 
AND CREATE GRID 
The four actions framework – eliminate, raise, reduce, and create – grid is another 
analytical tool from Blue Ocean Strategy.  It forces an organization to focus on the value-
cost trade-off created by raising and lowering factors needed to pursue strategic 
differentiation.139  The grid is an easily understood method for managers to not only ask 
the four key questions on which factors are to be eliminated, raised, reduced, or created, 
but also to act on them.140 
Table 6.   Four Actions Framework Grid [From Kim and Mauborgne] 
ELIMINATE 
• Barriers to police and private 
security cooperation 
• Weaknesses in radiological security 
 
REDUCE 
• Police reluctance to adopt new 
homeland security roles. 
• Police reliance on traditional after-




• Prevention efforts 
• Radiation security situational 
awareness 
• Overall material security 
• Private security capabilities 
CREATE 
• New radiological security network 
• Intelligence sharing and collection 
opportunities 
• Public and private partnerships 
• Multi-disciplinary teams 
 
                                                 
139 Kim and Mauborgne, 35. 
140 Ibid. 
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E. STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 
A strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and challenges (SWOC) analysis of a 
proposed strategy by an agency is a useful technique to identify the existing internal 
strengths and weaknesses that affect the proposed change and the external challenges and 
opportunities for the strategy to succeed in the future.  The matrix reveals areas of 
potential problems such as organizational resistance to the proposed change within and 
outside the agency.  Strong leadership will be needed to overcome the challenges but the 
outcome is greatly increased radiological security without a large expenditure of 
resources.  
 
Table 7.   S.W.O.C. Analysis 
INTERNAL EXTERNAL 
STRENGTHS OPPORTUNITIES 
• Builds on existing successful community 
policing model. 
• Sustainable 
• Minimal costs to agency 
• Increases security by focusing on 
prevention 
• To develop new homeland security 
partnerships 
• Radiation training can benefit both public 
and private partners 
• Intelligence sharing and collection 
• Creation of multi-disciplinary teams 
WEAKNESSES CHALLENGES 
• Lack of regulatory authority to enforce 
security regulations 
• Partnerships with private security may not 
be accepted because of traditional police 
organizational resistance to working with 
private security 
• Difficult to maintain partnerships after the 
initial creation period. 
• Possible resistance from some private 
agencies to join network due to fear of 
exposing security gaps. 
• Lack of support without outside funding 




F. STRATEGY CANVAS 
The strategy canvas is a diagnostic tool and analytic framework developed by W. 
Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne in Blue Ocean Strategy to examine uncontested market 
space.141  The model was developed for the private business sector but can also be used 
for analyzing strategic initiatives in the public sector.  The model serves two purposes.  
First, it captures the current state of affairs in an industry, graphically showing where 
current industry invests or concentrates activity.  Plotting across the factors of the 
industry on the horizontal axis allows us to map a strategic profile or value curve for the 
strategy.  This shows areas where traditional policing does not invest or invests 













Strategy Canvas for Radiological Security: 






Figure 4.   Strategy Canvas for Radiological Security [From Kim and Mauborgne] 
 
                                                 
141 W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy (Boston, MA:  Harvard Business 
School Press, 2005), 25. 
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G. MODEL POLICY IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
The police department can implement the policy using a similar model to that 
used in creating community policing programs.  First, identify the stakeholders in the 
community.  Then visit the neighborhood with them to identify problems and form 
partnerships to collaborate on solutions.  The community was always identified as the 
first line of defense in community policing.  Responsibility for neighborhood safety was 
theirs.  They had to assume ownership.  The community worked in collaboration with the 
police on neighborhood problems.  The same paradigm can be used for the radiological 
security “community.”  The police assist, but it is “their’ neighborhood.  A key element 
in this variation on the model is the involvement of the regional intelligence center for 
oversight and coordination. 
 
1) Identify Stakeholders:  The first step is to analyze the community of 
concern for radiological materials.  It is important to consider the entire 
life cycle of radiological material as part of the identification process. 
2) Stakeholders Meeting:  Schedule a meeting of the various security 
directors, radiation control directors, and administrators from industry, 
medicine, and research with the state radiation control program officials, 
police, fire, emergency medical services, federal, state, and local law 
enforcement intelligence representatives and other public safety partners.  
The purpose of the meeting is to explain the proposed law enforcement 
role, meet the stakeholders, and seek feedback and input into how to 
collaborate on increasing radiation material security.   
3) Site Visits:  The locations where the radiological materials are stored are 
visited by police, fire, and EMS and public safety experts.  During the site 
visit, potential problems are identified along with good practices. The site 
visit is not only an opportunity to walk through the physical location 
where radioactive materials are stored and observe security procedures; it 
is also helpful in gauging response in case of an accident or sabotage.  
Members of the site visit team should include police officers or homeland 
security officials who have been trained in vulnerability analysis and risk 
assessment.  
4) Collaborate on Response Plan:  A police department supervisor trained 
in hazardous materials collaborates with the facilities security director on 
the response plan and receives the plan.  The plan and facility layout with 
exact locations of materials and security measures will be considered law 
enforcement sensitive and not subject to public disclosure.  Information 
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developed on possible terrorist targets or suspicious activity will be shared 
with the regional intelligence center and state fusion center. 
5) Create a Functional Group within the Intelligence Fusion Center:  A 
radiation security network functional group should be established in the 
regional intelligence center.  Focused customer services are one of the 
keys to a successful intelligence system.  Protocols need to be established 
and background checks need to be conducted for private sector personnel, 
with these personnel fully integrated into the center as partners.   
6) Train and Exercise:  Tabletop exercises will be developed with the 
cooperation and participation of security directors to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the plans from both the public safety and private sector 
perspectives.  Additional training and exercising of response plans, such as 
red teaming and a field response exercise, will be planned with police 
partners.  The exercises are a means of evaluating the response plans.  
Information from the after-action critiques will be used to address issues 
that arise in the exercises. 
H. CONCLUSION 
Richard Falkenrath and others have made the argument that WMD terrorism is a 
“low probability, high consequence threat.”142  In terms of WMD’s, creating a biological 
weapon and an effective delivery system, or obtaining sufficient chemicals or creating a 
means of mixing chemicals to create a desired reaction that results in a lethal weapon, 
present formidable operational challenges.  However, the relative simplicity and 
availability of radioactive materials make an RDD the most likely unconventional 
weapon that Americans may be threatened with.  The terrorists would merely be adding 
an additional component to existing technology.  Their successful use of the weapon 
would demonstrate their movement’s power and prestige.  The New York Times recently 
reported that it had obtained a transcript of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed’s confession to 
CIA interrogators that dirty bomb operations on American soil were being planned by al 
Qaeda.143 
                                                 
142 Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, America’s Achilles Heel, 
Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack, (Cambridge, MA:  MIT Press, 1998), 41. 
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Even if the overall probability is low, the consequences of such an attack could be 
devastating to the American psyche.  Terrorists ultimately aim to instill fear.  A 
radiological weapon, containing a sufficiently strong radioactive element such as cobalt 
60, could render an area uninhabitable for decades.  The increased level of cancer rates 
that accompany exposure to radiation would prolong fear in the area.  As we saw after the 
incident at Chernobyl, young children and pregnant woman would suffer 
disproportionately following such an attack.  The full effects may not be apparent until 
the next generation is born, providing a haunting reminder of the original attack.   
This nation might react to such an attack in an unpredictable manner, much as a 
parent watching a child suffer may lash out.  Civil liberties could be curtailed or a new 
war could be launched against nations that support, or are perceived to support, terrorists.  
Media coverage of the incident would be unprecedented.  The pressure would be on the 
United States to respond forcefully.  This could even be the ultimate goal of the terrorists’ 
attack: to provoke the United States into another military action. 
The Department of Homeland Security is devoting significant resources to the 
dirty bomb threat.  It estimated that three billion dollars will be spent on deploying 
radiation detection technology in the next few years.144  The Securing the Cities Initiative 
is set to begin in New York City.  Radiation detection equipment will be deployed at the 
major access points into the city.   Detectors are being installed to screen all cargo 
containers at our seaports and all trucks at our border crossings.145  While these efforts 
are certainly worthwhile, our strategy to protect America has to focus on not only 
detection but also on denying access to material. 
Our ultimate goal should be a multi-layered approach focusing not just on 
response but on prevention as well.  A strong national intelligence system should be the 
backbone of our prevention program.  Groups who fit the profile for using these types of 
weapons should be prioritized for investigation.  Border security has been woefully 
                                                 
144 United States Department of Homeland Security, “DHS Announces Major Investment in Next-
Generation Radiological Detection Equipment,” Press Release July 14, 2006, 
http://www.dhs.gov.dhspublic/display/htm, [Accessed July 17, 2006]. 
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inadequate in terms of protecting our ports and containers from radioactive material 
smuggled into America.146  The NRC has attempted to increase radioactive security by 
involving local police agencies, but more needs to be done in terms of creating 
public/private partnerships in radiation security.  Many of our most dangerous radioactive 
elements are contained in hospitals with relatively light security.  The dangers posed by 
radiation are poorly understood by the public and even by many public safety personnel.  
A preparedness campaign should inform people of what steps they could take to mitigate 
the effects of an attack without scaring the public unnecessarily.  Education campaigns 
need to be conducted for security personnel in industry, medicine, and research on how 
they can help prevent materials from getting into the hands of terrorists.  Radiological 
terrorism is a legitimate threat and may be the ultimate inexpensive and technologically 
feasible mass casualty unconventional weapon that terrorists wield in the 21st century. 
The role of local police is changing rapidly and will continue to do so as the country 
faces new threats in an increasingly dynamic and global environment.  Local police will 
need to constantly redefine their policing roles and increase partnerships and information 
and intelligence sharing to deal with new threats.  Local police agencies are responding 
and taking on this new role.  Police in Boston and London have already recognized the 
radiological threat and have conducted site visits and created partnerships with 
universities and hospitals in an effort to increase security of materials.  The threat of 
terrorism is but one of the new international threats we face.  Global criminal cartels 
involved in narcotics trafficking have sought to undermine legitimate governments and 
also acquire weapons and have increasing ties to terrorism.  The future will require the 
police to collaborate and create networks to defeat the terrorist and criminal networks that 
are threatening America. 
The adoption of the proposed strategy of a public safety and private security 
partnership is in concurrence with the President’s National Strategy for Homeland 
Security.  It is of critical importance to integrate our local actions with state, federal, and 
especially the private sector to prepare for, respond to, and most importantly prevent 
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terrorist attacks using radiological material.  Private security protects and operates the 
majority of this country’s critical infrastructure, key resources and chemical, biological, 
and nuclear materials and industries.147  This strategy proposes a means to incorporate 
private security into a radiological security intelligence network.  Information can be 
collected, analyzed, and shared through regional and state fusion centers with our local 
law enforcement and private security partners, and then forwarded to the new national 
Department of Nuclear Detection Office.   
A recent GAO study has identified security weaknesses at locations where 
radioactive materials are held in lightly guarded environments such as hospitals.148  Local 
public safety personnel, police, fire, and emergency medical services will be the first 
responders to a terrorist event involving radioactive material.  This proposed strategy 
recognizes their primary role in the development and implementation of additional 
security for radiological sources. 
Budgets at all levels of government are constrained.  We have to develop ways to 
leverage the knowledge and resources of our federal, state, local, and private partners to 
keep these sources of radioactive materials from terrorist use.  Funding for homeland 
security has been cut 30 percent in the Boston UASI region and may be further reduced 
in the future; other major metropolitan areas have faced similar reductions.  Building 
sustainable, collaborative networks and sharing our limited resources may be our best 
option for securing our cities from terrorist attacks.   
This thesis answers the question of how local police can increase radiological 
security by collaborating with private security.  By using the proven community policing 
model, based on partnerships, intelligence, and education, this research proposes a model 
for local police to use in response to the federal government’s requirements for greater 
security for radiological material.  This thesis proposes a strategy that would be a low-
cost means to increase radiological security by developing a security network where the 
police are sharing the workload and information among various public and private 
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partners.  Local intelligence centers, or fusion centers, can lead this effort by working 
with the state radiological control program to identify source sites, assess the threat posed 
by the source material and type of facility, and make security recommendations based on 
this analysis.  The regional intelligence center would serve as an information sharing 
platform and provide overall guidance to the network.   
The emotional, psychological and economic “fallout” from a radiological terrorist 
attack would be devastating to this country.  This thesis proposes a model for local police 
agencies to help prevent radiological material from getting into the hands of terrorists.  
Intelligence-led policing will transform the future role of local police from being “first 
responders” to “first preventers” of terrorist acts. 
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IV. FUTURE AREAS OF RESEARCH 
Further research is recommended in the following areas: 
• Measure the effectiveness of the proposed collaborative strategy.  Security 
effectiveness could be measured through exercises.  Before and after 
comparison studies could be conducted.  Surveys of private security and 
facility personnel could be conducted as a measure of the policy on raising 
situational awareness.   
• Create and analyze intelligence sharing protocols among public and 
private partners.  This analysis should address the continuing dilemma of 
the “need to know” versus the “need to share,” and potential restrictions 
on sharing intelligence with private partners as well as the impact on 
security.   
• There are many similarities between security in the radiological and 
chemical industries.  Future research on expanding the model for 
increasing security for chemical plant security is also necessary. 
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